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SUBJECT: CAN WARSAW PACT MEMBERS QUIT?
/ MOSCOW MAY NOT KNOW

REF: A) MOSCOW 31520

11. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

12. AT THE END OF OCTOBER A STIR WAS CREATED AS THREE SOVIET SPOKESMEN STATED THAT EAST EUROPEAN STATES WERE FREE TO QUIT THE WARSAW PACT IF THEY SO DESIRED. THE SOVIETS REGARD THIS AS A LOGICAL OUTCOME OF THEIR POLICY OF "NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS." THEY INSIST THAT THEIR EAST EUROPEAN PARTNERS HAVE FULL "FREEDOM OF CHOICE." NEVERTHELESS, TOP PARTY FIGURES HAVE HINTED THAT THIS IS NOT A BLANKET FREEDOM. IN PRIVATE, GORBACHEV AND OTHERS HAVE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WARSAW PACT REMAINING INTACT. IN ADDITION, THEY HAVE UNDERSCORED THE IMPORTANCE OF "GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES" IN EASTERN EUROPE.

13. THE SOVIETS STRESS THAT NO WARSAW PACT MEMBERS HAVE EXPRESSED ANY INTEREST IN LEAVING THE ALLIANCE. IN FACT, SOVIET OFFICIALS ARGUE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE IN AN ALLY'S NATIONAL INTEREST TO LEAVE THE PACT. HOWEVER, MANY SOVIET SCHOLARS BELIEVE THAT HUNGARY COULD EDGE TOWARD NEUTRALITY IN THE NEAR-TERM. SOVIET LEADERS HAVE STRESSED THAT THEY WILL NOT APPLY MILITARY FORCE IN EASTERN EUROPE, REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. IN THE SENSE OF INTERVENING MILITARILY TO IMPOSE IDEOLOGICAL CONFORMITY, THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE APPEARS DEAD.

14. IT IS THOUGHT THAT THE COST OF TAKING MILITARY ACTION DIRECTED AGAINST A "DEFECTING" ALLY COULD BE ENORMOUS, BOTH IN ITS DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS. SHOULD HUNGARY MOVE TOWARD NEUTRALITY, THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO EMPLOY ONLY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MEANS TO DETER THE DECISION. GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES, HOWEVER, SEEM TO IMPOSE A SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT SET OF TOLERANCES AS REGARDS POLAND AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. TRADITIONAL SOVIET SECURITY CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS THESE COUNTRIES REMAIN HIGH AND THEIR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THE WARSAW PACT IS REGARDED BY MANY AS A FUNDAMENTAL FACTOR FOR SOVIET SECURITY AND EUROPEAN STABILITY. THIS MEANS THAT DESPITE SOVIET ASSURANCES THAT FORCE WILL NOT BE USED TO PREVENT WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PACT, THERE ARE CIRCUMSTANCES -- EXTREME THOUGH THEY MAY BE -- UNDER WHICH THE PROSPECT OF SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION TO PRESERVE THE VIABILITY OF THE WARSAW PACT CANNOT BE RULED OUT.

END SUMMARY AND COMMENT

15. THIS IS THE SECOND CABLE IN A THREE-PART SERIES ADDRESSING CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD CHANGES IN THE WARSAW PACT, WHICH WE HOPE WASHINGTON READERS WILL FIND USEFUL IN PREPARING FOR THE PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 2-3 MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. OTHER REPORTS FOCUS ON SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO

TRANSFORM THE WARSAW PACT FROM A MILITARY-POLITICAL TO A POLITICAL-MILITARY ALLIANCE (SEE REFTTEL), AS WELL AS THE ROLE THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD PLAY IN MAINTAINING EUROPEAN STABILITY IN THE 1990'S AND ADVANCING EAST-WEST RELATIONS (SEPTTEL TO FOLLOW).

16. THE SOVIET UNION INSISTS THAT IT IS NOT PREPARED MILITARILY TO IMPOSE ITS WILL ON ITS ALLIES. THE DOCTRINE OF THE DAY IS "NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS," AND SOLIDARITY'S SUCCESS IN POLAND GIVES IT SOME CREDIBILITY. AT HOME, GORBACHEV CONTINUES TO PUSH A BOLD PROGRAM OF REFORM. ABROAD, HE HAS ACTIVELY PROMOTED THE BUILDING OF A "COMMON EUROPEAN HOME." HIS FOREIGN POLICY GOAL IN EASTERN EUROPE IS STRAIGHTFORWARD -- STABILITY. BY THIS HE DOES NOT MEAN A HALT TO THE POLITICAL REFORM PROCESS, BUT STABILITY IN TERMS OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND "AMIABLE" RELATIONS. BUT DOES THIS REQUIRE THAT EAST EUROPEAN STATES REMAIN MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION?

A BARBERSHOP TRIO

17. AT THE END OF OCTOBER, THREE SOVIET OFFICIALS MADE STATEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES THAT EAST EUROPEAN NATIONS WERE FREE TO LEAVE THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION (WTO): YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET COUNCIL OF THE UNION; NIKOLAY SHISHLIN, A CENTRAL COMMITTEE AIDE WHO SPECIALIZES IN EASTERN EUROPE; AND MFA PRESS SPOKESMAN GENNADIY GERASIMOV (WHO LATER SAID HE HAD BEEN MISQUOTED). PRIMAKOV SAID THAT WTO MEMBER STATES WERE FREE TO LEAVE, BUT EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL BELIEF THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE IN THEIR INTEREST. SHISHLIN SAID THAT HUNGARY WAS FREE TO LEAVE THE WTO, BUT WAS MORE GUARDED WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY FOR THE GDR. FINALLY, GERASIMOV, REPEATING AN ANALOGY HE HAD MADE IN SEPTEMBER IN ITALY, SAID THAT THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE HAD BEEN REPLACED BY THE "FRANK SINATRA DOCTRINE," I.E. COUNTRIES CAN SAY "I DID IT MY WAY." (WE NOTE THAT SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IVAN ABOIMOV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE WTO POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, REFUSED TO COMMENT ON ANY OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS -- SEE MOSCOW 30503).

18. WHILE IT IS UNIQUE TO HEAR SUCH A HARMONIOUS CHORUS AT ONE TIME, SIMILAR STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY SOVIET SPOKESMEN IN RECENT MONTHS. SHISHLIN, FOR EXAMPLE, MADE THE SAME REMARK ABOUT HUNGARY IN A PARIS INTERVIEW IN SEPTEMBER. FURTHERMORE, PRIMAKOV'S REMARKS WERE VERY SIMILAR TO COMMENTS MADE BY MARSHAL SERGEY AKHROMEYEV IN JULY. AKHROMEYEV, IN WASHINGTON TO TESTIFY BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SAID EAST EUROPEAN NATIONS WERE FREE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO REMAIN IN THE PACT, BUT ADDED HE COULD NOT SEE ANY REASON FOR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO QUIT AS IT WOULD NOT BE IN THEIR INTEREST. IN ADDITION, AKHROMEYEV'S STATEMENTS ECHOED REMARKS MADE EARLIER BY OLEG BOGOMOLOV, THE DIRECTOR OF MOSCOW'S INSTITUTE OF THE ECONOMY OF THE WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM.

"FREEDOM OF CHOICE"

19. GORBACHEV ANNOUNCED IN HIS AUGUST 1 SPEECH TO THE SUPREME SOVIET THAT THERE WERE NO UNIVERSAL SOCIALIST MODELS AND THAT EACH COUNTRY'S PEOPLE DECIDE THE FUTURE OF THEIR COUNTRY THEMSELVES AND SELECT ITS SYSTEM ON THEIR OWN. HE INSISTED THAT NOBODY MAY INTERFERE IN THE AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY OR IMPOSE ITS VIEWS ABOUT ITS POLICY UNDER ANY PRETEXT. THE SOVIETS HAVE STRESSED THAT A FUNDAMENTAL PART OF

THEIR NEW POLITICAL THINKING IS FREEDOM OF CHOICE. POLITBURO MEMBER ALEKSANDR YAKOVLEV, CHAIRMAN OF THE CPSU'S INTERNATIONAL POLICY COMMISSION, SAID THAT THIS WAS THE "MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE OF EAST EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS." SHISHLIN TOO HAS EMPHASIZED THAT THIS POLICY MEANS THAT THERE IS NO LIMIT THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES MUST NOT EXCEED IN THEIR DOMESTIC POLICIES.

¶10. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE SOME HINTS THAT THIS IS NOT A BLANKET FREEDOM. IN PRIVATE TOP SOVIET LEADERS, GORBACHEV INCLUDED, HAVE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WARSAW PACT REMAINING INTACT. LAST WEEK, YAKOVLEV TOLD ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI THAT IT WOULD BE DESTABILIZING IF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES WERE TO PEEL OFF FROM THEIR CURRENT ALLIANCES. IN ADDITION, HE PLACED A PROVISIO ON "FREEDOM OF CHOICE" -- THAT THERE BE NO "INTERFERENCE FROM THE U.S. AND THE WEST IN GENERAL. SHISHLIN HAS ALSO NOTED THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN "GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES" WHICH COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT IGNORE.

BUT NO ONE WANTS TO LEAVE

¶11. MFA SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ADMINISTRATION CHIEF GORAL'D GORINOVICH EMPHASIZED TO POLOFF THAT THE HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP HAD NOT RAISED THE QUESTION OF LEAVING THE WTO, NOR HAD ANY OTHER PACT MEMBER STATE -- "NOT HUNGARY, NOT POLAND, NOT ROMANIA." HE SAID THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD NOT ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF WARSAW PACT MEMBERS POSSIBLY QUITTING THE ALLIANCE, AS NO MEMBER HAD EXPRESSED SUCH A DESIRE. IN RECENT MONTHS, THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY LITANY OF STATEMENTS OF FIRM AND UNDYING SUPPORT FOR THE WARSAW PACT FROM THOSE EAST EUROPEAN STATES WHICH ARE UNDERGOING REFORM.

COULD HUNGARY LEAVE THE WARSAW PACT?

¶12. NEVERTHELESS, MANY SOVIET SCHOLARS WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF HUNGARY DECIDED TO LEAVE THE WARSAW PACT, BECAUSE OF ITS EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR NEUTRALITY AND THE EXAMPLE OF NEUTRAL AUSTRIA JUST ACROSS THE DANUBE. HOWEVER, MOST OF THEM ARGUE THAT WERE HUNGARY TO DO SO -- ABSENT SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE WEST -- IT WOULD FIND ITSELF IN VERY DIFFICULT STRAITS. THEY BELIEVE THAT IF HUNGARY SEVERED ALL ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS OTHER EASTERN NEIGHBORS, IT COULD SIMPLY END UP CRIPPLING ITSELF.

¶13. HUNGARY'S WTO PARTICIPATION IS REGARDED AS MORE SYMBOLIC THAN SUBSTANTIAL. LIBERAL SCHOLARS HERE ARGUE THAT HUNGARY'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE WTO IS NOT REALLY SIGNIFICANT AND THAT EVEN IF IT ADOPTED NEUTRAL STATUS, THE OVERALL BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE WOULD REMAIN BASICALLY INTACT. IN FACT, USA INSTITUTE DEPARTMENT HEAD ANDREY KORTUNOV HAS ARGUED THAT IN MILITARY TERMS A GREATER THREAT MIGHT BE POSED BY COUNTRIES LIKE HUNGARY REMAINING IN THE ALLIANCE, DUE TO THE UNRELIABILITY OF THEIR TROOPS SHOULD A CONFLICT EVER ARISE.

PERHAPS HUNGARY COULD QUIT, BUT IT'S A SMALL FISH

¶14. THE PRINCIPAL CONCERN RAISED ABOUT A HUNGARIAN "DEFECTION" WOULD BE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF AN ALLIANCE MEMBER QUITTING AND THE CHANCE THAT OTHER PACT MEMBERS MIGHT DECIDE TO FOLLOW ITS EXAMPLE. IF HUNGARY DECIDED TO QUIT THE ALLIANCE, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE LOATH TO INTERVENE MILITARILY. INSTEAD, THEY WOULD MOST LIKELY SEEK TO

ENCOURAGE HUNGARY TO REMAIN A MEMBER BY USING
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LEVERS OF INFLUENCE.

¶15. MANY OF OUR SOVIET CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT THE
DEFECTION OF A LESS IMPORTANT WTO STATE, SUCH AS
HUNGARY, WOULD STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET CONSERVATIVES'
HAND, BY PROVIDING THEM WITH YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF
HOW GORBACHEV'S PERESTROYKA AND NEW POLITICAL
THINKING ARE UNDERMINING NATIONAL SECURITY.
NEVERTHELESS, WE AND OUR SOVIET CONTACTS DOUBT THAT
THIS COULD APPRECIABLY DIMINISH GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL
POWER, PARTICULARLY IN COMPARISON WITH THE DRASTIC
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC AND NATIONALITY PROBLEMS THAT HE
HAS TO FACE. THERE ARE BIGGER FISH IN THIS POND,
HOWEVER, WHOSE POSSIBLE DEFECTION COULD POSE A FAR
MORE DANGEROUS THREAT.

A SOVIET POLICY OF "DIFFERENTIATION"

¶16. MFA SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ADMINISTRATION CHIEF
GORINOVICH INSISTED THAT THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN HOW THE SOVIETS VIEWED HUNGARY, POLAND OR THE
GDR UNDER THE WARSAW PACT. NIKOLAY SHISHLIN,
HOWEVER, WAS HESITANT ABOUT PLACING HUNGARY AND THE
GDR IN THE SAME CATEGORY. ANDREY KORTUNOV, HEAD OF
THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES DEPARTMENT OF
IUSAC, HAS SAID THAT MANY SOVIET MILITARY MEN STILL
VIEW EASTERN EUROPE IN TERMS OF BUFFER ZONES AND
DEPTH OF DEFENSE. IN THEIR OPINION SOME EAST
EUROPEAN ALLIES, IN PARTICULAR THE GDR AND POLAND
WERE CRUCIAL TO SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS. YURIY
DAVYDOV, HEAD OF IUSAC'S "EUROPEAN CENTER" HAS VOICED
SIMILAR CONCERNS.

THE GDR: THE PACT'S KEYSTONE

¶17. SHISHLIN HAS STATED THAT "FREEDOM OF CHOICE" MUST
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT CERTAIN "GEO-POLITICAL REALITIES."
IN RECENT MONTHS, WE HAVE FREQUENTLY HEARD THIS
PHRASE VOICED IN DISCUSSIONS REGARDING THE FUTURE OF
THE GDR. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT FOR THE GDR,
THESE REALITIES COULD INCLUDE THE STATIONING OF
FOREIGN TROOPS IN THE FRG AND THE CURRENT SIZE OF THE
WEST GERMAN BUNDESWEHR, IF NOT THE EXISTENCE OF NATO
ITSELF. IN LIGHT OF SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS, IT IS
DIFFICULT TO ENVISION THE GDR BEING ABLE TO LEAVE THE
WARSAW PACT IN THE NEAR-TERM WITHOUT POSING A SERIOUS
THREAT TO SOVIET SECURITY AND OVERALL EUROPEAN
SECURITY.

¶18. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO ARGUE THAT THE GERMAN
QUESTION CAN ONLY BE RESOLVED WITHIN AN ALL-EUROPEAN
CONTEXT. IN FACT, VALENTIN FALIN, CHIEF OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, IS
REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS IN EARLY
OCTOBER (SEE BONN 32350) THAT THE USSR COULD ACCEPT
NEITHER GERMAN REUNIFICATION NOR THE GDR'S LEAVING
THE WARSAW PACT.

POLAND: LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND HISTORY

¶19. A GROUP OF AMERICAN SCHOLARS RECENTLY MET WITH
RAFAIL FEDOROV, A CENTRAL COMMITTEE AIDE, TO DISCUSS
DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. FEDOROV ADMITTED
THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD STRONG GEOPOLITICAL
INTERESTS IN POLAND, INSISTING, HOWEVER, THAT THEY
COINCIDED FULLY WITH POLISH NATIONAL INTERESTS. HE
SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT INTRUDE IN
POLISH AFFAIRS, BUT HIGHLIGHTED THE SUBSTANTIAL
NETWORK OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO
STATES, AS WELL AS THE OUTSTANDING "GERMAN
QUESTION." IN FACT, FEDOROV POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET

MILITARY FORCES IN POLAND WERE PRINCIPALLY IN THE WESTERN BORDER AREAS, LEAVING UNSAID THE FACT THAT THESE WERE FORMER GERMAN LANDS (WHICH WOULD FALL INSIDE THE 1937 BORDERS).

¶20. SOVIET SCHOLARS, AS WELL AS FEDOROV, HAVE NOTED THAT POLAND HAS BEEN THE TRADITIONAL PATH OF INVASION TO THE SOVIET UNION AND NOW PLAYS A CRUCIAL ROLE IN MILITARY LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO THE GDR. THESE FACTORS EVOKE CONSIDERABLE EMOTION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET MILITARY -- AND MANY CIVILIANS -- AND CAST INTO DOUBT THE PROPOSITION THAT THE POLES WOULD BE TOTALLY FREE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN LOT. SIMILARLY, KORTUNOV NOTED THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF POLAND QUITTING THE ALLIANCE, WHICH BEARS THE NAME OF ITS CAPITAL, COULD BE DEVASTATING. IN FACT, WE WERE TOLD BY A CONTACT IN THE MFA ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT ADMINISTRATION THAT THIS WAS ONE FACTOR THAT HAD LED THE SOVIETS TO CONSIDER PROPOSING WARSAW AS THE POSSIBLE SEAT FOR A PERMANENT WARSAW PACT HEADQUARTERS.

COST OF STOPPING ANY DEFECTOR WOULD BE HIGH

¶21. SOVIET SCHOLARS DRAW A BLANK WHEN ASKED WHAT COULD BE DONE TO STOP A POTENTIAL DEFECTOR. THE STANDARD METHOD UNDER "OLD THINKING" -- SENDING IN THE TROOPS -- IS REGARDED AS PARTICULARLY OUT OF STEP WITH THE TIMES. YAKOVLEV HAS INSISTED PRIVATELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT APPLY MILITARY FORCE IN EASTERN EUROPE, REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. SHISHLIN, TOO, HAS SAID THAT THE USSR IS "OPPOSED TO ANY USE OF TROOPS IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' INTERNAL AFFAIRS. TO DO SO WOULD BE A TOTAL REPUDIATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY LINE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ESPOUSED FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS.

¶22. FURTHERMORE, MANY SOVIET SCHOLARS WE HAVE SPOKEN WITH BELIEVE THAT IF THE USSR WERE TO TAKE ANY MILITARY ACTION AGAINST A DEPARTING WARSAW TREATY MEMBER, IT WOULD RISK DESTROYING MOST OF ITS RECENT FOREIGN POLICY ACCOMPLISHMENTS. RELATIONS WITH THE WEST WOULD LIKELY COME TO A STANDSTILL -- PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND EXPANDING ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE COULD VANISH.

¶23. FINALLY, THE DOMESTIC RAMIFICATIONS OF SUCH A POLICY COULD BE UNPRECEDENTED. THERE IS A CHANCE THAT A MAJOR MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EASTERN EUROPE COULD LEAD TO A CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND THAT THE REFORM MOVEMENT UNDERWAY HERE MIGHT COME TO A RAPID HALT. IT WOULD BE HARD TO IMAGINE THAT A MILITARY MOVE AGAINST REFORMERS ABROAD WOULD NOT HAVE A CONCOMITANT IMPACT ON REFORMERS AT HOME -- JUST AS THE 1968 WTO INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA CHILLED REFORM THROUGHOUT EASTERN EUROPE.

COMMENT

¶24. THE SOVIETS HAVE WOVEN FOR THEMSELVES A FOREIGN POLICY PARADOX. THEY APPEAR TO BE PERFECTLY PREPARED TO LET THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES FOLLOW THEIR OWN INDIVIDUAL PATHS TO SOCIALISM -- OR WHEREVER ELSE THEY MAY BE HEADED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH "NEW POLITICAL THINKING." NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE THEIR BASIC REJECTION OF POWER POLITICS, THEY BELIEVE THAT THESE STATES WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO USE THIS NEW FOUND FREEDOM TO TAKE STEPS THAT COULD UNDERMINE SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS -- IN THIS CASE, LEAVING THE WARSAW PACT -- BECAUSE THE SOVIETS BELIEVE TO DO SO WOULD NOT BE IN SUCH A STATE'S NATIONAL INTEREST.

¶25. IS THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE THEREFORE A THING OF THE PAST? IN OUR VIEW THE ANSWER IS BOTH YES AND NO. IN

THE SENSE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD INTERVENE TO ENFORCE IDEOLOGICAL CONFORMITY -- TO ENSURE THAT A CLIENT STATE FOLLOWED THE SOVIET MODEL OR PATH TO SOCIALISM, IT APPEARS THAT THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE IS INDEED DEAD. IN A BROADER, GEO-POLITICAL SENSE, HOWEVER, A MORE BASIC FORM OF THE DOCTRINE MAY REMAIN. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO HAVE FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY CONCERNS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THESE FACTORS CANNOT BE OVERLOOKED WHEN EVALUATING BASIC SOVIET NATIONAL INTERESTS. TO DATE, REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE HAS, REASSURINGLY FOR THE SOVIETS, PROCEEDED WITHOUT EITHER SUBSTANTIAL MANIFESTATIONS OF ANTI-SOVIET FEELING OR DOMESTIC TURMOIL WHICH THREATENED TO GET OUT OF CONTROL. GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL POPULARITY AMONG EASTERN EUROPEANS SEEKING REFORM HAS THUS FAR SERVED ESSENTIAL SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS WELL.

¶26. THERE IS, NEVERTHELESS, A POINT AT WHICH THE SOVIET UNION'S LEADERSHIP COULD FEEL COMPELLED, EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD DESTROY MUCH OF THE PROGRESS IT HAS RECENTLY ACHIEVED, TO MOVE MILITARILY IN EASTERN EUROPE. AS DETAILED ABOVE, THE MOST LIKELY VENUES FOR SUCH ACTION WOULD BE IN EITHER POLAND OR THE GDR. EVEN HERE, WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT GORBACHEV WOULD USE EVERY POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LEVER HE COULD TO PRECLUDE HAVING TO INITIATE SUCH AN ACTION. THEREFORE, THE SPECTER OF SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION, WHICH HAS HUNG OVER EASTERN EUROPE FOR THE PAST FORTY YEARS, THOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN ENTIRELY DISPELLED, HAS FADED APPRECIABLY.

¶27. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

MATLOCK